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Executive Summary
For tens of millions of people in the US, owning a home is the essence of the 
American dream, representing as it does economic achievement and some measure 
of security. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., would undoubtedly agree, and he aspired 
to make the dream more broadly available—to people of color as well as Whites, to 
poor people as well as rich.
But the culture and the environment have worked against people of color in this 
respect as in many others, putting many obstacles in the way. There is a long tradi-
tion of economic and, more specifically, housing discrimination in the US, ranging 
from a century of legal slavery to exclusion from participating in wealth-building 
programs like the Homestead Act of the 1800s and the GI Bill of the late twenti-
eth century. These are programs that gave millions of Americans the assistance and 
tools they needed to improve their economic lives, and they fostered the growth of 
a strong, flourishing middle class—one of the main hallmarks of America’s strength 
and appeal.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, millions of people at the lower end of 
the economic spectrum face a new obstacle, one that has spread its tentacles across 
the country and across the globe. The subprime lending crisis has occurred because 
a financial product intended for limited use by a limited number of people has been 
parlayed into another ill-fated bubble by some mortgage lenders lacking in integrity, 
foresight, and any vestige of civic concern. The crisis has ruined many economic lives 
and many communities. It has cost the financial institutions that underwrote mas-
sive numbers of shaky subprime loans hundreds of billions of dollars. There is talk 
of a government bail-out. These losses in turn triggered an ongoing global economic 
crisis, the end of which we have not yet seen. And the next chapter in the subprime 
crisis could well be a deep US economic recession.
More important than all of these consequences is the targeting of people of color 
and poor people as the best candidates to sign up for one of these loans. In the hands 
of the mortgage lending industry, subprime loans became predatory loans—a faulty 
product that was ruthlessly hawked even though financial institutions were aware of 
its defects. Even a surface check of the demographics shows that, in city after city, a 
solid majority of subprime loan recipients were people of color.
Hungry for new and different products, the financial services industry added features 
to these loans—exploding adjustable rates, balloon payments, penalties for early 
re-payment—that hobbled their recipients financially and made it unlikely that they 
would be able, after a brief honeymoon period, to repay the loans at all.
A deeper look into the crisis reveals that the subprime lending debacle has caused the 
greatest loss of wealth to people of color in modern US history.
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The spillover effect from the wholesale writing of bad loans is that communi-
ties are torn apart. As one house after another in a neighborhood goes vacant, 
squatters move in, crime and the likelihood of fires spike, local stores and busi-
nesses close. The value of the houses other people in the vicinity, who have not 
taken out subprime loans, live in deteriorates by thousands of dollars. The tax 
base for the municipality or the state erodes, since many fewer people are living 
there and paying taxes. This in turn leads to revenue shortfalls and the need to 
save money by spending less on public services, teachers, police and firefighters, 
repairs to bridges and schools, and other government activities that enable com-
munities to offer residents quality of life.
The subprime crisis has pulled a large chunk of wealth away from many, many 
middle- and lower-income people, in the form of homes and home equity—a 
primary, even sole, asset for those without great wealth. The government has 
remained silent and inactive. But there are things that can be done.
Just as rules have favored one group of individuals or another throughout US 
history, so can rules be used now to help the victims of this crisis regain produc-
tive lives, wealth, and homes. There are many things that residents and their 
governments, working together, can do to alleviate the crisis: federal investment 
in financing homes, lowering the cap on the mortgage deduction, providing 
incentives for developers to build affordable homes, regulating the mortgage 
industry, and dedicating federal estate tax revenues to housing disaster relief.
It won’t happen on its own. Your opinion and your actions matter. Take a mo-
ment to visit our interactive web page [http://www.faireconomy.org/dream] and 
register your thoughts.
A deeper look into 
the crisis reveals 
that the subprime 
lending debacle has 
caused the greatest 
loss of wealth to 
people of color in 
modern US history.
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Key Findings
We estimate the total loss of wealth for people of color to be between $164 
billion and $213 billion for subprime loans taken during the past eight 
years. We believe this represents the greatest loss of wealth for people of 
color in modern US history.
From subprime loans, Black/African American borrowers will lose between 
$71 billion and $92 billion, while Latino borrowers will lose between $75 
billion and $98 billion for the same period.
According to federal data, people of color are more than three times more 
likely to have subprime loans: high-cost loans account for 55% of loans to 
Blacks, but only 17% of loans to Whites.
If subprime loans had been distributed equitably, losses for white people 
would be 44.5% higher and losses for people of color would be about 24% 
lower. This is evidence of systemic prejudice and institutional racism.
Based on improvements in Median Household Net Worth before the cur-
rent crisis (from 1982 to 2004), it would take 594 more years for Blacks/Af-
rican-Americans to achieve parity with Whites. The current crisis is likely to 
make it take much longer. 
Homeownership rates for Blacks/African-Americans compared to Whites 
are already starting to take back recent gains. At the current rate of 
improvement (from 1970 to 2006), parity will not be achieved for another 
5,423 years.
The spillover effect of the subprime crisis affects whole communities 
negatively, in terms of abandoned houses, increased crime, devaluation of 
neighboring houses, and erosion of the tax base, causing revenue shortfalls 
that mandate service cuts. The crisis is having a negative impact on property 
owners, as well as neighborhoods, and local and state governments.
Rules made the crisis worse, and rule change can make it better via better 
policies. Just as many policies in the past and today have supported asset 
development for the wealthy, so can new policies support asset development 
for those injured by the subprime crisis.
Broad racial and economic inequalities need to be addressed for the success 
of any policy solutions to the subprime crisis.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Introduction
Today, for millions of people in this country the American dream of prosperity 
and financial security is no longer a reality. For millions more, this dream was 
never a reality, and has become much harder to achieve. Homeownership is at 
the foundation of the American dream, and this foundation has crumbled under 
the crash of the subprime mortgage market.
The loss of wealth from the subprime crisis for all people living in the U.S. is 
expected to be staggering. Conservative estimates put the total direct loss for 
subprime loans made during the past eight years between $356 billion and $462 
billion. This does not account for spillover losses from reduced property values 
and taxes, or losses to lenders.1
While the housing crisis has affected all sectors of society, it has disproportion-
ately affected communities and individuals of color. For them, the dream that 
Martin Luther King, Jr. once spoke of has been foreclosed. The current housing 
crisis, caused in part by the predatory and unregulated practices of the subprime 
lending market, has had a dual effect on communities of color. It has drastically 
shrunk the market that helped create the opportunity for millions of people 
of color to gain homeownership—a key factor for class mobility in the United 
States. It has also stripped communities of color of one of their largest trans-
formational assets: ownership of their neighborhoods and the collective wealth 
potential this ownership provides.
The foreclosure crisis is far from over. Two million additional homes are expect-
ed to foreclose in the coming year. Because of its magnitude, the impact of the 
housing crisis reaches far beyond the individual consumer.2 Just as home owner-
ship is a key component of building wealth for individuals, so does it act in a 
similar way for communities. Homeownership contributes to the existence of 
thriving schools, hospitals, local businesses and green space in all communities. 
As homes are boarded up or abandoned, communities fail.
Given that people of color are a disproportionate number of the subprime bor-
rowers, and that this group’s assets are mostly concentrated in homeownership, 
the current foreclosure crisis can be considered the greatest loss of wealth for 
communities and individuals of color in modern US history.
We found that all subprime borrowers of color will lose between $164 billion 
and $213 billion for loans taken during the past eight years. Black/African-
American borrowers will lose between $72 billion and $93 billion, while Latino 
borrowers will lose between $76 billion and $98 billion for the same period.3
“America has given the 
Negro people a bad 
check; a check marked 
‘insufficient funds.’ We 
refuse to believe that 
there are insufficient 
funds in the great 
vaults of opportunity 
of this nation...” 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
March on Washington 
for Jobs and Freedom, 
1963
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We also found that comparing projected losses for each racial group to their 
share of the total population shows clearly that these loans have been racially 
predatory. In fact, we show that if these loans had been distributed equitably, 
Whites would lose more wealth and people of color would lose less wealth than 
actual projections.
While the subprime mortgage collapse has received a lot of public attention, its 
causes remain obscure and elusive. Plans to solve the crisis have arisen in differ-
ent parts of the country, but they are more of a band-aid than a comprehensive 
antibiotic for the disease of inequality. We believe that persistent racial and 
economic inequalities that continue to manifest broadly in US society are at the 
root of this crisis and need to be addressed for any policy solutions to be truly 
successful.
In recent years, insufficient or absent public policy has contributed to expanding 
the racial wealth divide, leaving communities of color lagging behind while the 
wealthiest and Whitest segments of US society continue to advance.
Increasing wealth access and preservation for people of color is central to ad-
dressing racial economic disparities. In the past, great asset-building public poli-
cies such as the GI Bill, Social Security, and the Homestead Act supported class 
mobility for millions of US residents. Despite the discrimination embedded in 
these bills, they create an important precedent—that the United States has the 
tools and capacity to address economic inequality successfully. Racial economic 
inequality needs to be addressed through broad-spectrum, holistic public policy. 
It is only through new versions of collaborative, inclusive, and culturally ap-
propriate policy that we can prevent the foreclosure of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
dream of justice and equal opportunity for all.
Foreclosed: State of the Dream 2008 explains the mechanisms that allowed the 
subprime mortgage debacle to happen, explores how this crisis affects individu-
als and communities of color, and proposes comprehensive policy solutions to 
the crisis. It is an interactive document that will change and grow as people share 
their foreclosure stories and opinions on policy recommendations, and engage 
with us in exploring concrete action steps geared towards assuring that people of 
all colors have access to the home, and the life, of their dreams.
Why focus on Wealth?
As income comes and goes 
like a flowing river, wealth 
(what you own minus what 
you owe) is a reservoir 
to handle hard economic 
times, make large 
purchases, help secure the 
future of new generations, 
and protect individuals and 
families as they age. While 
getting and keeping a job is 
necessary for any measure 
of economic opportunity, 
income from work by 
itself is often insufficient 
to escape poverty. While 
approximately 29% of 
people of color fall below 
the federal poverty line, 
79% of Black people can 
be considered “asset poor” 
compared to only 40% of 
their White counterparts.  
Being “asset poor” means 
that an individual or family, 
without the flow of income, 
cannot maintain their 
current economic lifestyle 
for three months.
Please visit http://www.faireconomy.org/dream to share your thoughts with us.
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1. The Subprime Crisis:  
 Inequality by Design
The American Dream and Homeownership
Homeownership is central to reaching economic equality and closing the grow-
ing divide between the wealthiest people in the US and everyone else in the 
country. Nearly 60 percent of the total wealth held by middle-class families 
resides in their home equity (the value of their home minus the amount they 
owe on it).4 Furthermore, homeownership is essential in acquiring other as-
sets, including access to high-paying, good-quality jobs (with retirement plans, 
healthcare and other asset options), high-performing public schools, cleaner 
neighborhoods, and better health.5
Dr. King spoke the words noted above in 1963. Forty-five years later, Detroit 
has become the number one city in foreclosure filings among the one hundred 
largest metro areas in the US.6 Detroit also ranks number three  in cities with 
the largest Black population, with its 775,772 Black residents making up more 
than 80% of the population.7 The vast majority of the people losing their homes 
in Detroit are Black. This is just one example of how the subprime lending crisis 
is throwing into sharp relief both historical and contemporary forms of racial 
housing inequality.
Senator Charles E. Schumer, Chair of the Joint Economic Committee, and 
Representative Carolyn B. Mooney, Vice Chair, “estimate that there will be ap-
proximately 1.3 million foreclosures, and loss of housing wealth of more than 
$103 billion through the end of 2009 (including $71 billion in direct costs to 
homeowners and $32 billion in indirect costs caused by the spillover effects of 
foreclosure).”8 Others project an even higher cost; for example, the Center for 
Responsible Lending estimated that foreclosures will cost about $164 billion for 
loans made in the last eight years.9 Since African-Americans and Latinos hold a 
disproportionate number of subprime loans, this crisis is stripping their families 
and communities of assets and hard-earned wealth.
Ongoing Housing Discrimination in the US
Systematic discrimination in housing has been a pattern in American history. A 
report released in December 2007 titled Residential Segregation and Housing Dis-
crimination in the United States said that “according to the most recent estimates 
from the United States Census Bureau, Latinos constitute 14.8% of the United 
States population, while the non-Latino population is 66.4% White, 13.4% 
African-American, 4.9% Asian, 1.5% American Indian or Alaskan Native, and 
0.34% Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander.
“I have a dream this 
afternoon that one day 
right here in Detroit, 
Negroes will be able to 
buy a house or rent a 
house anywhere that 
their money will 
carry them.” 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 Speech at the Great 
March on Detroit, 
1963
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However, “[t]he average White person in metropolitan America lives in a neigh-
borhood that is 80% White and 7% Black.” In stark contrast, “[a] typical Black 
individual lives in a neighborhood that is only 33% White and as much as 51% 
Black, making African-Americans the most residentially segregated group in the 
United States.”10 In addition, the report establishes that “for many years, the 
federal government itself was responsible for promoting racial discrimination in 
housing and residential segregation.”
Subprime Lending: A Twenty-First Century Wealth 
Problem
Subprime lending is a relatively recent development. It has been heralded as a 
tool to expand the housing market by helping those with less than ideal credit 
buy homes.
“Sub-prime lending is a fancy financial term for high-interest loans to peo-
ple who would otherwise be considered too risky for a conventional loan. 
These include middle-class families who have accumulated too much debt 
and low-income working families who want to buy a home in the inflated 
housing market. To cover their risk, lenders charge such borrowers high-
er-than-conventional interest rates. Or they make ‘adjustable rate’ loans, 
which offer low initial interest rates that jump sharply after a few years.”11
Starting in the early 1990s as a small niche market, by 2006 the subprime 
mortgage industry rose to 20.1% of the market, growing from a $35 billion to a 
www.faireconomy.org
Source: “Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to Homeowners,” 
December 2006, Center for Responsible Lending <www.responsiblelending.org>.
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$665 billion-a year-business.12 Unlike the banking industry, which has long been 
subject to significant federal oversight through regulation, the mortgage lending 
industry is essentially unregulated.
The rise in subprime loans, viewed from the demand side, was due to the rising 
cost of housing and the simultaneous stagnation of income for households in re-
cent years. According to The State of the Nation’s Housing, a 2007 report from 
the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, “the number of 
households spending more than half their incomes on housing is rising rapidly. 
In 2005, the number of such cost-burdened households jumped by 1.2 million 
to a total of 17 million.”
www.faireconomy.org
Source: “Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to Homeowners,” 
December 2006, Center for Responsible Lending <www.responsiblelending.org>.
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While other factors continue to affect the economic mobility of people of color, 
income is a key factor to upward mobility. Because of discrimination, suburban 
job locations, and lack of educational attainment, access to jobs with adequate 
income is often limited for people of color. Income inequality among employed 
individuals is further exacerbated by race. Thus, if subprime loans were meant 
to target households whose income was not high enough to qualify for conven-
tional loans, this meant a majority of households of color.
www.faireconomy.org
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables, Table P-1 
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p01w.
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Total Labor Force by Race
White - 68.5%
Black - 14.1%
Latino - 11.9%
Asian American - 5.0%
Native American - .06%
Employment Status by Race
Offi cials and Managers
White - 83.6%
Black - 6.7%
Latino - 5.4%
Asian American - 4.0%
Native American - .04%
Service Workers
White - 53.2%
Black - 23.5%
Latino - 18.4%
Asian American - 4.1%
Native American - .09%
Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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The financial industry viewed the need of many households to qualify for large 
loans despite low incomes as an open invitation to increase its profits signifi-
cantly. This is the supply-side view. With interest rates at historic lows, money 
had until recently been cheap and plentiful. The more loans mortgage brokers 
made, the more money they made, with no consequences to themselves if the 
loans failed. Banks and other finance companies would then buy up bundles of 
subprime loans and sell them off to investors in other financial markets, such 
as hedge funds.13 With the chain of accountability stretched loosely over several 
industries, no one had to pay the piper until rapidly increasing default rates left 
lenders holding bundles of worthless paper instead of lucrative subprime loans.
Many subprime borrowers were refinancing existing mortgages in order to pay 
off credit card debt, rising in part due to the increasing cost of medical care, 
childcare, gasoline, and other expenses. Brokers in the unregulated mortgage 
market convinced low- and middle-income families that “borrowing against 
their homes was a sensible way to plug holes in household budgets.”14
In addition to the economic situation and lack of regulation that allowed un-af-
fordable loan making to flourish, the inherent risk of subprime loans added to 
the potential for default. Traditional loans are often made between individuals 
and the banks where they customarily do business. The loan then resides with 
the issuing bank. In the past, this relationship was essential to the home- buy-
ing process, depending on accountability between the homebuyer or refinanc-
ing household and the bank. With the subprime lending process, however, a 
mortgage broker gets a commission based on the cost of the loan to the buyer, 
with whom he or she often has no prior or subsequent connection. The more 
expensive the loan, the larger the commission.
Martin Eakes of the Center for Responsible Lending, in testimony in Septem-
ber of 2007 before Congress’s Joint Economic Committee, said, “The subprime 
mortgage market as currently structured doesn’t have adequate incentives to po-
lice itself; in fact, subprime lenders continue to have strong incentives to make 
harmful loans.”15 Eakes went on to present the following facts:
Mortgage brokers, who issue approximately 70% of subprime mortgag-
es, are not required to offer loans that are in the borrowers’ best interest.
Brokers and lenders make more money when they steer people into 
high-cost subprime loans, even when those people are qualified for a 
lower-cost prime loan. Lenders also provide brokers incentives to in-
clude prepayment penalties costing borrowers thousands of dollars and 
carrying significantly higher charges for foreclosure.
Lenders, until recently, reaped huge profits by ignoring a homeowner’s 
ability to repay the loan and/or neglecting to document the homeown-
er’s income.
Unscrupulous lenders gain a competitive advantage over honest lenders 
when they exclude the cost of taxes and insurance from monthly mort-
gage payments to make the loan appear more affordable.
•
•
•
•
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Since loans typically pass from broker to lender to investors, it has been 
easy to avoid accountability for abusive mortgages.
On the surface, subprime loan products can sound relatively simple and attrac-
tive, and some people have benefited from their use. Yet, as more details of the 
industry’s activities began to surface, the predatory practices of many subprime 
loan brokers came to the forefront. Unless inexperienced borrowers asked 
complex questions about loan terms covered only in the fine print, they received 
loans that they had little to no chance of repaying. As we will see ahead, these 
predatory subprime loans were disproportionately and systematically aimed at 
people of color. 
What makes a subprime loan predatory?
High interest or subprime loans are often difficult for a household to handle. 
They were intended to be used sparingly and discerningly to help people with 
poor credit achieve stated goals. The widespread exploitation of subprime loans, 
often with exotic modifications, turns a product with major limitations into one 
that is actually faulty, or defective. One factor that makes subprime loans preda-
tory is their marketing and sales to inappropriate customers.
Predatory practices flourish because mortgage brokers are unregulated, and the 
government has been silent on the subject. According to the Center for Re-
sponsible Lending, 7.2 million families hold subprime mortgages. In the loans 
that originated between 2005-2006 alone, 1 in 5 will result in foreclosure. For 
the spectrum of subprime loans made between 1998 and 2006, 2.2 million will 
result in foreclosure.16 
Here are some ways in which high-interest, subprime loans are predatory:
1. Pre-payment Penalties
According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 2000 
report, “a pre-payment penalty is assessed against a borrower who repays his/her 
loan before the end of the loan term. Pre-payment can occur as the result of the 
mortgage borrower moving, refinancing the loan, or paying on an accelerated 
basis. For lenders, a pre-payment penalty is designed to reduce the incidence of 
pre-payment and compensate the lender for any costs resulting from pre-pay-
ment. Penalties are typically assessed only for pre-payment within a specified 
period of years after the loan is closed.”17 In other words, once a household has 
a subprime loan with a pre-payment penalty, they are unable to leave that loan 
early without paying a substantial amount of money as a premium. Therefore, 
this practice protects the Wall Street underwriters, and forces households with 
these loans to keep them, even once they become aware of their predatory na-
ture. In many cases those hit with pre-payment penalties were unaware that they 
were part of their loans, or did not know that they were not necessary. Seventy 
percent of subprime loans have pre-payment penalties.18
• Ninja Loans
A demeaning joke 
circulating among 
bankers in recent years 
involved asking another 
banker whether he/she 
had heard of “ninja” 
loans – a loan made 
to someone with “no 
income, no job, 
no assets.”
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2. Adjustable Rate Mortgages (Exploding ARMs)
Today the majority of subprime loans are adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs. 
These loans come initially with a relatively low “teaser” rate and then increase 
substantially within a short time period. They are often called 2/28s and 3/27s, 
meaning that after the initial 2- or 3-year period the interest rate will increase 
by a third or more. Taking a conservative approach, a $900 monthly mortgage 
would increase to $1200, which does not include other expenses such as insur-
ance and taxes. This loan structure creates what is known as “balloon” or “ex-
ploding” payments. Through the second quarter of 2006, hybrid ARMs made 
up 81% of the subprime sectors’ securitized loans, up from 64% in 2002.19
Securitized loans are commercial real estate loans 
that are pooled with other similar loans and sold 
as securities. They are sometimes referred to as 
“commercial mortgage-backed securities.”
From Timothy J. Heinrich and Patrick O. Hayes. 
“Borrowers Beware.” Texas Lawyer, March 15, 2004.
Hybrid ARMs are mortgages which start out at fixed 
rates for several years before turning into adjustable-
rate loans.
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3. Exclusion of Taxes and Insurance
In an effort to appear cheaper or more desirable than traditional loans, brokers 
wrote subprime loans excluding taxes and other related expenses to “reduce” 
the amount of the initial monthly payment. This practice placed the lender in a 
situation that seemed to be economically beneficial, but actually created a more 
difficult pay-back situation, especially when the loans were ARMs.
4. Steering
This illegal and discriminatory practice manifested on both the supply and 
demand sides of the subprime market. Mortgage brokers and other financial 
institutions deliberately targeted asset-poor communities whose members were 
eager to acquire homes. Members of asset-poor communities were lured into 
loans under false premises. This practice was coupled with giving subprime loans 
to middle- and lower-income families and households (typically people of color) 
that qualified for conventional (market-rate) loans but were given higher-cost 
loans instead.
5. Interest-Only
An interest-only loan was originally intended for buyers acquiring properties to 
resell, or for buyers living temporarily in an investment property. In recent years, 
however, this type of loan was offered with increasing frequency to low- and 
middle-income families who had no intention of moving in the near future. This 
loan structures the payment of interest only, during the beginning phase. Once 
that phase ends (in previous years, around the time that investment owners were 
ready to sell), payments on the principal are then added to the initial payment, 
resulting in exorbitant payments for hapless buyers planning to stay in their 
homes. This product was aimed at low- and middle-income buyers because of 
the high commission yield that mortgage brokers could garner from its sales.
6. Lack of Stated Income/Ability to Repay
In many instances, subprime lenders exaggerated the worth of homes being refi-
nanced, failed to document the income of households applying for loans, and/or 
failed to assess the ability of borrowers to repay the loan. (Traditional refinanc-
ing loans typically include a process whereby the property is assessed but higher 
value does not benefit the back end with higher commissions.) Documentation 
of income and assessment of the ability to repay are essential steps that protect 
both the potential homeowner or refinancer and the lending institution.
These predatory and unscrupulous practices were identified as early as 2000 by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and community groups, 
but concerns fell on deaf ears as the market continued its unregulated growth. 
This growth, very profitable for brokers and lenders, was based on the virtual 
destruction of the bank accounts and credit of low-income people and people of 
color, who are currently taking the brunt of the subprime foreclosure crisis.
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Senator Charles E. Schumer’s speech at the Brookings Institute, December 20, 2007
FOUR MYTHS SURROUNDING THE SUBPRIME CRISIS:
I want to focus for a few minutes on the four myths surrounding the administra-
tion’s limited response to this crisis and then I want to spend some time talking 
about the seven steps we need to take to get a handle on this crisis and hopefully 
avert a recession, or at least prevent a prolonged or debilitating recession.
1. The Myth of Vastly Expanded Home Ownership from Subprime Lending
The first myth is that most of this subprime lending led to millions of brand-new, 
first-time homeowners in America. The fact is that only a small percentage of 
subprime borrowers were first time homeowners. According to the chief national 
bank examiner for the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, only 11 percent of 
subprime loans went to first-time buyers last year. The vast majorities were refi-
nancing that caused borrowers to owe more on their homes under the guise that 
they were saving money. Too many of these borrowers were talked into refinanc-
ing their homes to gain additional cash for things like medical bills. Other subprime 
borrowers were homeowners that simply moved to another house; and too large a 
percentage went to investors and speculators. And the truth is, after this subprime 
crisis blows over, there will be a net loss of homeownership in this country.
2. The Myth of the Unqualified Borrower
The second myth is that subprime borrowers couldn’t have qualified for better 
loans, and thus that the subprime market is the only place they could have gotten 
a mortgage. A corollary follows that these people can’t be helped by the govern-
ment or refinancing. But in truth, many of these people were PRIME borrowers. I 
had been talking about this myth for months, but policymakers ignored it, which is a 
major reason they wouldn’t act to solve this problem.
Finally, to its credit, the Wall Street Journal did a study confirming what I, and oth-
ers like Martin Eakes at the Center for Responsible Lending had been saying for 
so long—a majority of subprime borrowers would have qualified for conventional 
prime-rate loans. Based on the Journal’s analysis of borrowers’ credit scores, 55 
percent of subprime borrowers had credit scores worthy of a prime, conventional 
mortgage in 2005. By the end of last year, that percentage rose to over 61 percent 
according to their study. While some will have damaged their credit in the interim, 
it’s clear that many subprime borrowers have the financial foundation for sustain-
able homeownership, but may have been tricked into unaffordable loans by unscru-
pulous brokers.
3. The Myth that Borrowers Can Easily Obtain Perfect Knowledge of the 
Terms of Their Mortgage Loans
When market participants have full knowledge of transactions, the results are 
efficient. But we have known since shortly after Adam Smith that they do not func-
tion well when important information is lacking. We make a great mistake when 
we accept the myth that the borrowers in mortgage markets are fully informed. 
The truth is that almost no one reads his entire mortgage document’s fine print, 
few hire special real estate lawyers to walk them through the home purchase, and 
frankly, many borrowers were tricked or duped into bad loans by unscrupulous 
brokers and lenders.
State of the Dream 2008: Foreclosed State of the Dream 2008: Foreclosed 
Some ideologues blame the borrowers, and while that might make them feel better, 
it does nothing to solve this problem. That ideology is straight out of the 1890’s and 
the early 1900’s.
4. The Myth that the Free Market Alone Will Fix Everything
This administration is wedded to the philosophy that government should take a 
hands-off approach to governing and to dealing with economic crises. This crisis 
has been no exception. The myth that left to their own devices, free market forces 
will correct the disruptions caused by the subprime crisis has caused us perhaps the 
most economic pain because it has allowed the subprime crisis to wreak havoc in 
other areas of the economy.
Throughout the course of this year, the administration and its financial market 
regulators have repeated time and time again that the subprime crisis would be con-
tained and mitigated by the strength of the U.S. economy.
Then, in August of this year, we began to witness the beginnings of a severe credit 
crunch in the U.S. credit markets that forced financial institutions to limit the 
amount of loans that they offered to individuals and companies.
As the administration looked on, the credit crisis trickled into the Alt-A and prime 
mortgage markets, pushing up mortgage rates for borrowers with even the best 
credit.
The tightening of lending and lack of confidence in credit quality has led to shrinking 
investment and consumption, and a slowdown in economic growth.
And the fallout wasn’t limited to the U.S. We may even see a downturn in the 
global economy, as Secretary Summers has warned.
Today, the crisis is fueling a housing downturn that will hit every American family 
where it hurts the most—their equity. And as a result, we are facing an economic 
downturn that we haven’t seen in this country since the Great Depression.
Economists like Robert Shiller estimate that a 10 percent decline in housing prices 
could lead to an overall $2.3 trillion economic loss at a time when this country can 
least afford it. $2.3 trillion in economic losses!
Unfettered free market forces did not contain this problem within the subprime 
segment of the housing market. Far from it. And the laissez-faire philosophy that 
allowed this crisis to spread far and wide won’t get us out of this mess, either. Just 
ask my friend, Frank Ruggiero.
Frank Ruggiero was not a new homeowner. Frank Ruggiero had a steady income 
and reasonable credit, he could have qualified for a prime loan. Frank Ruggiero did 
not have perfect knowledge of his loan. He trusted his broker to give him accurate 
information. The free market did not save Frank’s home. His family lost the home 
thanks to the unaffordable subprime loan foisted on him by an unscrupulous broker.
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Who was targeted?
In the twenty-first century, we continue to discover evidence of discrimination 
capable of eroding the dream of equality that Martin Luther King, Jr. once 
spoke passionately about. There is clear evidence that Latinos and African-
American individuals and communities have suffered disproportionately in the 
subprime crisis. 
www.faireconomy.org
Source: ACORN: Foreclosure Exposure: A Study of Racial and Income Disparities in Home Mortgage Lending in 
172 American Cities <http://acorn.org/fi leadmin/HMDA/2007/HMDAreport2007.pdf>.
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A 2007 report by the Federal Reserve Board’s Community Advisory Council shows 
that the nation’s largest lenders with both prime and subprime businesses make a 
disproportionate share of their higher-cost loans to minority borrowers across the 
nation. The report, Paying More for the American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of 
Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending, examines the cost of borrowing in six metro-
politan areas: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, Charlotte, and Rochester. 
It focuses on seven of the biggest lenders that issue both higher-cost subprime and 
lower-cost prime loans: Citigroup, Countrywide, GMAC, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, 
Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo. Some of the most significant findings of this 
report are the following:
In these six metropolitan areas, African-American borrowers were 3.8 times 
more likely to receive a higher-cost home purchase loan than were White 
borrowers.
In the same six metro areas, Latino borrowers were 3.6 times more likely 
than White borrowers to receive a higher-cost home purchase loan.
For these seven lenders, the percentage of total home purchase loans to 
African-Americans that were higher-cost was six times greater than the per-
centage of higher-cost home purchase loans to Whites in the six cities (41.1 
percent vs. 6.9 percent).
In the same cities, for the same lenders, the percentage of total home pur-
chase loans to Latinos that were higher-cost was 4.8 times greater than the 
percentage of higher-cost home purchase loans to Whites (32.8 percent vs. 
6.9 percent).
•
•
•
•
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In each of the cities examined, the seven lenders combined showed 
larger African-American/White and Latino/White disparities than those 
exhibited in the overall lending market.
The worst disparity for any individual lending group was observed in 
Chicago, where African-American borrowers were 14 times more likely 
to receive a higher-cost home purchase loan from Wells Fargo than were 
White borrowers (35.3 percent vs. 2.5 percent).
•
•
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Estimated Loss of Wealth Due to 
Predatory Lending, by Race
 Racial Percent of Loss using 15.4% Loss using 20%
 Group Subprime Market* Rate of Foreclosure** Rate of Foreclosure
 White 53.9% $191.8 $249.1
 Black 20.1% $71.5 $92.9
 Latino 21.3% $75.8 $98.5
 Total People 46.1% $164.1 $213.1
 of Color
 Total Subprime 100% $355.9 $462.2
 Borrowers
Source Notes: Calculations of data from NCRC 2006 Report: Homeownership and Wealth 
Building Impeded: Continuing Lending Disparities for Minorities and Emerging 
Obstacles for Middle-Class and Female Borrowers of All Races; and Center for 
Responsible Lending Report: “Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their 
Cost to Homeowners,” Table 6 and Figure 1. 
 * In 2004.     ** In billions. For loans made 1998-2006.
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People of color are being hit especially hard. Just in direct losses, we found that 
all subprime borrowers of color will lose between $164 billion and $213 billion 
for loans taken during the past eight years. Black/African-American borrowers 
will lose between $72 billion and $93 billion, while Latino borrowers will lose 
between $76 billion and $98 billion for the same period.20
We found that comparing projected losses for each racial group to their share of 
the total population shows clearly that these loans have been racially predatory. 
To measure the relative impact of the racially predatory approach, we compared 
the actual projections to what we might expect in an ideal, non-biased distribu-
tion scenario. In such a case, each racial group would receive subprime loans in 
the same ratio as their share of the general population.
We found that if loans had been distributed in this equitable manner, losses for 
White people would be greater and losses for people of color would be less. In 
fact, the difference between these two extremes shows a staggering difference in 
total direct losses between Whites and people of color due to the racially preda-
tory nature of subprime loans.
www.faireconomy.org
Source Notes:   NCRC 2006 Report: “Homeownership and Wealth Building Impeded: Continuing Lending Disparities 
for Minorities and Emerging Obstacles for Middle-Class and Female Borrowers of All Races.” 
Center for Responsible Lending Report: “Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to 
Homeowners.” Calculations compared racial distribution of subprime loans in 2004 and 2007 US 
Census data for racial distribution of total population for eight years of subprime market. 
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Mike Calhoun, president of the Center for Responsible Lending, states that al-
most half of all African-American family mortgages are subprime mortgages. To 
illustrate the racial discrimination present in the mortgage industry, he describes 
a 2000 case in which a subprime mortgage lender agreed to settle for more than 
$7 million after being accused of charging higher fees to African-American 
women than to similarly situated White males. Calhoun states that, because of 
the racial underpinnings of the subprime crisis, it “stands to likely be the largest 
loss of African-American wealth that we have ever seen, wiping out a generation 
of home wealth building.”21
At the April 2007 Coalition on Homelessness and Housing in Ohio Annual 
Conference,22 Kristen Komara of the Resurrection Project in Chicago related 
ways in which minority communities—in this case, Latinos—were cold-blood-
edly targeted by subprime lenders. Foreclosures and predatory lending are 
significant problems among Chicago’s Latino communities. Chicago foreclosures 
are at their highest levels in eight years.23
Komara details how predatory lenders target this community, including the 
use of high-pressure sales techniques pushing inappropriate loan products and 
practices such as:
Stated-income loans
Interest-only loans
Automatic lender acceptance of over-stated incomes
Failure of lenders to adequately explain terms of loans
•
•
•
•
Option ARMs are adjustable-rate mortgages that typically 
let borrowers choose one of four different payments each 
month. From smallest to largest, they are: a minimum 
monthly payment, an interest-only payment, full principal 
and interest amortized over 30 years, or full principal and 
interest amortized over 15 years. 
Source: Hazards of Option ARMs by Kathleen Pender, San Francisco 
Chronicle, June 21, 2005.
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In Chicago, lenders are investing heavily in advertising non-traditional loans in 
the Spanish media, and taking advantage of the fact that Latinos are historically 
more comfortable working with mortgage brokers than traditional bankers, in 
part because they believe brokers are obligated to work in their best interest.
The subprime lending industry is well aware of the historic lack of financial 
information and issues with credit history that prevail in the Latino community. 
There are often language barriers in loan negotiations. Without regulation, high-
interest, high-risk loans are rampant, deliberately targeted to communities with 
this kind of profile. According to Komara, Latinos are 30 percent more likely 
than Whites to receive a high-cost home loan. Forty percent of loans to Latinos 
are subprime versus 19 percent to Whites. A Business Week cover story describes 
Option ARMs as maybe “the riskiest and most complicated home loan product 
ever invented.”24 In Chicago, Latinos are twice as likely as Whites to receive an 
Option ARM.
IRA’S LOAN
Nikitra S. Bailey, Center for Responsible Lending
Ira Cheatham is a seventy-three-year-old retired veteran who has lived with 
his wife, Hazel, in a predominantly African American neighborhood of Portland, 
Oregon, for twenty-one years. In 2002, when they had nearly paid off their 
mortgage, the Cheathams received a check for roughly $1,000 in the mail from 
a finance company. For an older couple living on limited retirement income, the 
sudden appearance of this money seemed like a dream come true. They cashed 
the check and in the process took out a very high-interest loan. 
The lender followed up by calling the Cheathams and urging them to consolidate 
the loan with their credit card debt into a single mortgage. The Cheathams, who 
apparently had good credit at the time, were promised an interest rate between 
5 and 6 percent. However, when the loan papers were presented, the interest 
rate was 9.9 percent, with an annual percentage rate of 11.8 percent. Moreover, 
their loan contained ten “discount points” amounting to $15,289. The lender 
financed these points as part of the loan, stripping away equity the Cheathams 
had earned through years of mortgage payments. The loan also contained a 
prepayment penalty, requiring the Cheathams to pay the lender approximately 
$7,500 to escape their predatory loan. Cheatham noted that he received a call 
from the lender when the lender “happened” to be right down the street with 
a neighbor. It seems clear that this African American neighborhood was being 
systematically targeted and stripped.
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Conclusion
We believe that many people in the US think that racial discrimination was 
somehow “fixed” during the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. Yet even a 
desultory poking under the surface of the subprime lending debacle shows how 
much and how deeply prejudicial actions remain rooted in American business 
practices.
A phenomenon—the subprime lending crisis—that at first glance seems to have 
nothing to do with race or ethnicity reveals that it is actually steeped in dis-
crimination. Analysis indicates that it would be fair to say that racial prejudice 
inspired banks and brokers to deliberately and coldly seek to boost their profits 
by targeting minority subjects with faulty loan products. In a saturated market, 
questionable measures that in previous decades would have been roundly con-
demned as predatory and therefore unacceptable, began to look more and more 
attractive to an industry worried about its future profits.
Strategically speaking, what better solution for these woes could the industry 
find, than a new and untapped market—financially challenged would-be hom-
eowners—in its own backyard? Such individuals and communities represented 
a good opportunity to sell products. But the products would have to be tailored 
to the target communities’ characteristics. Historically, these included poor 
or non-existing credit, lack of liquidity, a low degree of financial literacy, and 
discomfort in dealing with banks. A strategic plan that would fill all these needs 
could well consist of using the industry’s plentiful cash (due in part to unusually 
low interest rates) to make high-risk, subprime loans, through the intermediary 
of unregulated mortgage lenders, to Blacks and Latinos in the US.
The short-term gains of such a strategy were undeniable: sell more product, 
get higher yields due to higher rates, design and market new products (exotic 
loans), and subvert regulation by using mortgage lenders as agents. And the 
consequences—shattered lives and dreams, massive numbers of foreclosures and 
abandoned houses across the nation, destroyed neighborhoods, eroded tax bases, 
and ultimately, a worldwide economic crisis with the likelihood of a potentially 
severe US recession—well, somebody could deal with those later.
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II. Subprime Spillover:  
 Communities Torn Apart
Losing the Community Benefits of Homeownership
The spate of home mortgage foreclosures has affected individuals and communi-
ties in a wide, interrelated wave that continues to spread and deepen. Because 
homeownership is one of the key driving forces of the US economy, the foreclo-
sure crisis has had grave effects on neighborhoods, cities, and states.
There has been much research on the community benefits of homeownership. In 
a 2003 report sponsored by the Homeownership Alliance, Robert Dietz men-
tions youth academic achievement, civic participation, environmental awareness, 
and reduced crime as some of the social benefits of homeownership.25 A 2002 
study conducted by the Institute for Policy Studies at John Hopkins University 
concluded that homeownership improves children’s educational outcomes.26 In 
2001, researchers from Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies concluded 
that homeownership increases neighborhood stability and political participa-
tion.27 Although few studies establish a direct correlation between foreclosure 
rates and negative community outcomes, it is clear that if homeownership brings 
benefits to the community, foreclosures—and the slew of empty, boarded-up 
houses that follows—will have the opposite effect.
A recent study by ACORN concluded that foreclosures increase violent crime in 
neighborhoods, decrease property values, and “reduce city tax revenue, making 
it harder to provide good schools, police protection, code enforcement and other 
services.”28 According to Immergluck and Smith, in a study that focuses on 
Chicago, “one standard deviation increase in the foreclosure rate (about 2.8 fore-
closures for every 100 owner-occupied properties in one year) corresponds to an 
increase in neighborhood violent crime of approximately 6.7%.”29 It is interest-
ing to note that Detroit ranked number one in foreclosure filings among the one 
hundred largest metro areas in the US between January and June 2007,30 and 
was also ranked the most dangerous city in the US for 2007 by CQ Press.31
The ACORN study also concludes that, as the foreclosure crisis widens, prop-
erty owners, local governments, lenders, and investors stand to lose more than 
twenty-five billion dollars in 96 metropolitan areas studied. A 2005 report by 
the Homeownership Preservation Foundation states that foreclosures “involve 
more than a dozen agencies and twice as many municipal activities, and generate 
municipal costs that in some cases exceed $30,000 per property.”32 The increased 
municipal costs include policing and fire fighting, demolition contracts, build-
ing inspections, legal fees, and expenses associated with managing the foreclo-
sure process. To continue with our Detroit example, in this city 2,804 of the 
high-cost loans made in 2006 are likely to go into foreclosure. ACORN research 
“We are caught in an 
inescapable network 
of mutuality, tied in 
a single garment of 
destiny. Whatever 
affects one directly 
affects all indirectly.”
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Letter From a 
Birmingham Jail, 
1963
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CRIME IN SLAVIC VILLAGE
Foreclosures hit Cleveland early and hard. By the summer of 2007, 
it had four of the top 21 ZIP codes for foreclosure filings in the 
United States. Slavic Village tops this list, becoming the hardest hit 
community in the US.* Founded in the 1840s by Polish and Bohe-
mian immigrants who worked in area steel mills and factories, the 
neighborhood is now mostly working class and 26% Black. 
More than 800 houses now sit vacant and moldering in the area. 
One of the first things that happened after owners moved out was 
that squatters and looters moved in. Many houses in Slavic Village 
have had their siding stripped up to the roof-lines. When a house is 
abandoned, people will dump garbage in its yard, break its windows, 
and steal its doors. In Cleveland’s cold and damp climate, the houses 
deteriorate quickly. Putting a house back together takes money, 
more money than the restored home could bring on the market. 
Recent reports describe the crime wave sparked at the Slavic Vil-
lage as the “perfect storm.”** Some of the most notorious crimes in 
recent records include:
• September 1: “Cookie” Thomas, 12, was shot in the neck while 
walking home from the corner store after buying a bottle of 
Sunny Delight, a small bag of chips and two pieces of sour gum. 
She was hit by a stray bullet as the result of two men shooting at 
each other. 
• July 20: Grady Smith II, 27, was working on his car when some-
one walked up and shot him in the face.
• March 15: Joseph Krasucki, 78, was bludgeoned to death at his 
house on Hosmer Avenue. Thugs had attacked him five times 
before.***
As the number of empty lots and abandoned houses grow where 
houses and residents once flourished in a tight community, there are 
fewer and fewer neighbors organizing to save their community. 
* Les Christie. “Where Cleveland Went Wrong.” CNNMoney.com. November 14, 2007.
** Les Christie. “Crime Scene: Foreclosure.” CNNMoney.com. November 19, 2007.
*** Andy Netzel. “Can Anyone Save Slavic Village?” Cleveland Magazine.com. November, 
2007.
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estimates that the cost of these foreclosures to the local Detroit government will 
be $53,913,431.33 This will significantly decrease the resources available for law 
enforcement and crime prevention programs.
Since foreclosures impact communities of color in disproportionate ways, the 
current homeownership crisis threatens to become a massive barrier in this 
country’s journey towards racial justice. If we take into consideration that 
inequality continues to be a problem today, the compounded negative effects of 
foreclosures cannot be overlooked by those engaged in the movement towards 
true economic equality in the US. Hurricane Katrina and the socio-economic 
crisis that ensued in its aftermath illustrate the urgent need to deal with the 
foreclosure crisis in a racial economic justice context.
Katrina, Housing Injustices, and the Foreclosure Crisis 
Hurricane Katrina showcased some of the greatest economic racial dispari-
ties that this country has seen in recent history. This natural disaster placed 
nearly 80% of New Orleans underwater, displacing nearly one million people 
who were overwhelmingly people of color. Racial injustice was alive and well 
throughout Katrina and its aftermath, and became evident in everything from 
inadequate rescue efforts to prejudiced media images, public officials’ comments, 
and unfulfilled government promises.
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Several years after Katrina, racial disparity continues. Before the hurricane, there 
was already a significant shortage of housing for low-income renters in New 
Orleans.34 According to the Brookings Institute Katrina Index, housing dispari-
ties in Katrina-affected areas continue to worsen. After the hurricane, rents 
increased by 200% in the most storm-damaged parishes. As of August 2007, 
there were no rental units available below market price. From 82,000 rental 
units damaged in the hurricane, only 33,000 were on track for rebuilding under 
state-administered restoration programs.35 The housing shortage was made worse 
when, amid vehement protests from neighborhood groups, New Orleans City 
Council recently moved to demolish thousands of low-income houses. Demoli-
tion crews will now move in to dismantle 4,500 brick buildings that had been 
the homes of generations of low-income residents. The units will be replaced 
with mixed-income housing.36
The creation of Recovery Zones in New Orleans has made the housing problem 
worse for African-Americans wanting to return. Recovery Zones were intended 
to help in rebuilding the city rapidly. In March 2007, Mayor Nagin announced:
 The city will provide loans and other incentives to developers interest-
ed in investing in key locations within the zones. The zones are gen-
erally high visibility sites, with sufficient land and other assets. They 
also have a high potential to attract investors and possess adequate 
resources to catalyze development such as schools and libraries.37
Nevertheless, redevelopment plans in these zones exclude African-American 
owners whose damaged properties are said to contribute to urban decay. Their 
properties are being seized by the city using eminent domain laws. Jacob Faber, 
a researcher at the Center for Social Inclusion, states that “evidence of eminent 
domain abuse can be found in the overwhelmingly-Black Lower 9th Ward, 
where the city bulldozed homes without informing their owners.”38
The foreclosure crisis, with its deep racial economic injustice implications, will 
only exacerbate the housing crisis caused by Katrina. Homeowners who lost 
their property for lack of insurance were overwhelmingly Black. After the burst 
of the housing bubble and the subprime lending crisis that ensued, they are even 
less likely to get the loans needed to rebuild their homes or purchase new homes 
in the city’s mixed income developments. Real Estate web information sources 
emphasize that:
 Credit availability and the terms for which it can be had have tightened 
and risk aversion has accelerated over the last month. This will continue. 
Lending standards are reverting to pre-real estate bubble levels. Loan-to-
Value ratios on many mortgages will hit 80/20 again, which will require 
large cash down payments on home purchases. These conditions are going 
to lock many people out of buying or even refinancing. A consumer’s debt-
to-income and credit history is going to come into play more and more.39
Former first lady Barbara 
Bush, during a tour of 
the Houston Astrodome 
with her husband and 
other political VIPs a few 
days after Hurricane 
Katrina, observed: 
“Almost everyone I’ve 
talked to says, ‘We’re 
going to move to 
Houston.’ What I’m 
hearing, which is sort of 
scary, is they all want to 
stay in Texas. Everyone 
is so overwhelmed by the 
hospitality. And so many 
of the people in the 
arena here, you know, 
were underprivileged 
anyway, so this, this is 
working very well for 
them.”
Marketplace, National 
Public Radio, 9/5/05
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The credit crunch is much more likely to affect Black homeowners because of 
deep patterns of racial disparities in income in New Orleans, where White me-
dian income is $61,000 while Black median income is only $25,000, less than 
half the income of Whites.40
New Orleans is a city struggling to heal. Countless politicians, church groups, 
celebrities, and average Americans have said that getting the city back to its pre-
Katrina level is of paramount importance, not just to the city but to the nation 
as a whole. But predatory lending practices in Louisiana, combined with the 
subprime mortgage crisis, are digging the already-beleaguered city even deeper 
into poverty and trouble. The report Fair Lending Helps Community Prosperity, 
issued jointly by United for a Fair Economy and the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition in April 2007 reveals that in post-Katrina New Orleans
twice as many mortgage requests from Blacks are denied as for Whites, and
forty-nine percent of Black homeowners received high-cost subprime 
loans compared to 18% of their White counterparts.
Furthermore, ACORN studied the expected costs of foreclosures in 96 metro-
politan areas across the US. The price tag for New Orleans is estimated to be 
more than $60 million.41
Most Americans will not soon forget the images of people, so many of them 
Black, stranded on rooftops, faces hopefully raised toward helicopters passing by 
overhead. As more incidents of racial inequality gain national media attention, 
it is clear that racial prejudice, and its economic implications, continues to be a 
problem in the 21st century.
The “Subprime Spillover” Effect
The foreclosure crisis can only exacerbate racial economic injustice, and 
economic inequality in general. Would anyone, for example, believe that this 
country has achieved full equality in its public education system? Can we say 
that all US children have access to quality public schools? The answer is a 
vehement “No!” To get quality public schools we need adequate school funding, 
and school funding is in jeopardy in communities with high foreclosure rates. 
The Center for Responsible Lending projects that, nationally, foreclosures on 
subprime home loans originated in 2005 and 2006 will have the following 
impact on property values:
Almost 45 million neighboring homes will experience devaluation be-
cause of subprime foreclosures that take place nearby.
The total decline in housing values and tax base from nearby foreclo-
sures will be $223 billion.
Homeowners living near foreclosed properties will see their property 
values decrease $5,000 on average.42
•
•
•
•
•
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In a 2006 report, Immergluck and Smith found that the “most conservative 
estimates indicate that each conventional foreclosure within an eighth of a mile 
of a single-family home results in a decline of 0.9 percent in value.”43
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Source: Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the U.S. - Rising Debt and the Middle Class Squeeze by Edward 
Wolff, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College <http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_502.pdf>.
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Lower property values mean lower property tax revenues and decreased funding 
for public schools in the numerous states that utilize property tax revenues to 
finance education. The Center for Responsible Lending, for example, emphasiz-
es that foreclosures will have a negative effect on economic conditions that reach 
far beyond the neighborhood or town that is directly affected. Dubbing it the 
subprime “spillover” effect, the Center says that “foreclosures themselves further 
depress local housing prices.” They calculate the dollars that are being lost to the 
nation’s homeowners and state treasuries, in terms of lower property value and a 
reduced tax base for communities.
In the state of Massachusetts, for example, the projected number of homes that 
will be lost to foreclosure as a result of subprime mortgages negotiated between 
2005 and 2006 is 15,279. More than one million neighboring homes will expe-
rience devaluation as a result of these foreclosures, for a decrease in housing val-
ues/tax base of almost $5 billion.44 This loss is even more alarming if we consider 
that Massachusetts relies more than most states on local governments to provide 
revenue, largely by means of property taxes, for elementary and secondary public 
education.45
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California, one of our biggest and most populous states, will be experiencing 
even more sizable aftershocks from the subprime industry crash. Tens of 
thousands of houses are expected to be lost to foreclosure—180,000, to be more 
precise. That means 180,000 families or households will suffer disruption and 
a damaging loss of assets, with the likely possibility that a significant percent-
age of the houses foreclosed will fall into disrepair or abandonment. As many as 
8.4 million other houses will be devalued as a result of high foreclosure rates in 
their neighborhoods—$8,000 on average per house. Taken together, California’s 
counties will have to cope with a combined decrease of $68 billion in house 
values and tax base—primarily property taxes—in its major metropolitan areas 
alone.46 In terms of the effect of the subprime market collapse on education, 
consider that California funds about a quarter of its K-12 and community col-
lege education through local property taxes (about $14 billion). An additional 
$2 billion for education comes from other types of property taxes.47
The consequences of foreclosures reach far beyond individual bank accounts to 
threaten essential community resources such as high-quality public schools.
How is the subprime crisis affecting your 
community? Share your story at:
http://www.faireconomy.org/dream
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Conclusion  
Communities of color, in a country that is still very far from racial economic 
justice, are especially threatened by the foreclosure crisis.
www.faireconomy.org
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics <http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=ln>.
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Losing homes is tantamount to losing wealth at a time when wealth disparities 
are already overwhelming. Many focus on income as a key to economic security 
for people of color, but assets are a better predictor of which individuals and 
families will have economic stability. The United States Conference of Mayors 
Task Force on Poverty says that “the magnitude of the poverty problem is daunt-
ing. More than 37 million people are still officially poor today, despite the fact 
the more than one-half of poor families are now working.”
The situation is even less promising when viewed through a race lens:
Forty-six percent of people of color own homes compared to 76% of 
their White counterparts
A quarter of the Black population lives in poverty compared to 8%  
of Whites
People of color are three times as likely as their White counterparts to 
live in poverty
•
•
•
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White median family income is more than twice Black median family 
income
For every dollar of White wealth, people of color have 15 cents
•
•
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 3 
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov3.html>.
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These disparities are due in part to a history of discriminatory practices in asset-
building economic policies enacted by our local, state and federal government. 
According to a report released in 2004 by the Corporation For Enterprise 
Development, the government spends $335 billion on asset-building policies. 
The report stated that federal policies “disproportionately benefit those who 
already have assets. Analysis of the largest spending categories shows that over a 
third of the benefits go to the wealthiest 1% of Americans—those who typically 
earn over $1 million per year. In contrast, less than 5% of the benefits go to the 
bottom 60% of taxpayers.”
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III: Where do we go from here
The challenge facing our nation is not a lack of wealth but a destructive distri-
bution of wealth. Over the last 40 years, the US economy has shifted from one 
that was producing a strong middle class, to an economy that serves the richest 
among us almost exclusively and concentrates wealth among the wealthiest in 
society. This has created a growing wealth divide. This wealth divide has hurt 
historically marginalized communities like African-Americans and current low-
income immigrant populations that are overwhelmingly Latino.
In 1966, A. Phillip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, stewards of the Civil Rights 
movement, advocated a comprehensive federal budget proposal. They called 
this proposal the Freedom Budget. The Freedom Budget proposed a new federal 
investment in the poor of the nation, an investment that for the first time would 
not be blocked from reaching Black Americans due to segregation. The Free-
dom Budget was endorsed by most mainstream civil rights organizations and 
even some Black power advocates such as Stokely Carmichael—yet not by our 
nation’s legislature.
The Freedom Budget would never be implemented. The war in Vietnam would 
end up consuming billions of dollars and distracting the nation from healing 
the wounds of racial discrimination. When Dr. King was killed, along with 
his demise went the demise of his poor people’s campaign. Fiscal conservatives 
would oppose increases in federal social spending, and the election of Richard 
Nixon would seal the door to the possibilities of the Freedom Budget. Over the 
last forty years we have seen a regressive economic climate where the rich are 
getting richer, the middle class and poor are struggling to make ends meet, and 
the racial wealth divide continues to keep race a mark of division in the United 
States.
Forty years after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, we believe it is 
not too late to implement the economic reforms Dr. King knew were needed to 
make his dream a reality.
Ending the Homeownership Divide
As discussed throughout this report, homeownership is the primary form of 
wealth for most Americans. As is so apparent throughout American history, 
leaving homeownership to the dictates and uncertainty of the private market 
has never been adequate in developing homeownership for most Americans. 
Whether it was the Homestead Act of the 1800s, the GI Bill of the 1940s, or 
ongoing federal mortgage insurance programs, government subsidies have been 
a necessary component to increasing homeownership.
Between the 1930s, the time of the Great Depression, and the early 1950s, 
marking the beginning of the Civil Rights movement, billions were invested in 
“We must work 
assiduously and with 
determined boldness 
to remove from 
the body politic this 
cancerous disease of 
discrimination . . . , 
then and only then will 
we be able to bring 
into full realization the 
dream of our American 
democracy – a dream 
yet unfulfilled.”
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Golden Anniversary 
Conference of the 
National Urban League, 
1965
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American homeownership. The post-World War II housing boom was fueled 
by subsidized assistance to over 35 million Americans between 1948 and 1972. 
During these years, 11 million families bought homes and another 22 mil-
lion improved their properties.48 The biggest beneficiary was primarily White 
suburbia, where half of all housing could claim Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA) financing in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The home mortgage interest and property tax deduction also disproportionately 
benefited suburban homeowners. Interstate highway construction served as an 
indirect subsidy, as it opened up inexpensive land for suburban commuters. At 
the end of World War II, the percentage of US citizens that owned their own 
home was about 44 percent. In 2004, 76 percent of Whites owned their own 
home, compared to 49.1% of Blacks and 48.1% of Latinos.49
The progressive economic measures prevailing at that time had a positive impact 
in strengthening the economic situations of most middle-class and lower-income 
Americans, but due to the openly racist nature of the country also prevalent 
during this time, it reinforced the economic supremacy of Whites in relation to 
people of color as well. Since the end of legal segregation in the late 1960s, there 
has not been any comparable federal mass investment in homeownership that 
would benefit disenfranchised people of color. The following policy solutions 
can change this situation.
1. Lower the Ceiling for Mortgage Deductions
One of the first steps that needs to be taken to promote equal opportunity 
homeownership is removing the subsidies that promote a growing economic 
divide in this country and redirecting these subsidies to broadening our middle-
class economy. In 2005 President Bush’s advisory commission on tax reform 
recommended lowering the mortgage interest deduction that overwhelmingly 
and disproportionately benefits the richest of Americans. Currently, home- 
owners can deduct all interest paid on mortgages as high as $1.1 million. Presi-
dent Bush’s advisory commission recommended that the mortgage ceiling for 
such tax deductions be placed on a sliding scale that is related to the real estate 
market of an area. In 2005, the recommended ceiling was $415,000 in the most 
expensive areas.
Implementing this recommendation would not stop people from taking out 
larger mortgages. It would just prevent the American public from subsidiz-
ing the interest on mortgages greater than $415,000. Since the median price 
of a home in the US is slightly more than $200,000, it is clear that most 
homeowners’ mortgage amounts would not be over this proposed limit. Mr. 
Bush’s advisory team also recommended greater progressivity in the policy by 
making the mortgage interest deduction a tax credit instead of a tax deduction. 
To get a tax deduction, one would have to have total itemized deductions higher 
than the standard deduction offered. Only a third of taxpayers find it worth-
while to itemize their deductions, and these are usually the richest third. How-
ever, a tax credit would assist all taxpayers—not just those with higher incomes.
  United for a Fair Economy
2. Increase the Development of Affordable Homes
In the private market, the sole motivating force is profit—not just the drive to 
make a profit, but to make the greatest possible profit. This often has limited 
private market opportunities for the non-wealthy, particularly as it relates to 
housing. The higher profit margins that come with building expensive homes 
have made the affordable housing market less attractive for private home devel-
opment companies. But government subsidy of housing development through 
tax credits would make affordable housing more attractive for private develop-
ment. Government regulation could also ensure that private developers ben-
efiting from public investment fulfill their responsibility to increase the public 
good, not just private profit.
Affordable Housing Tax Credits - The federal government could fund and 
have distributed by state agencies tax credits to home developers that 
build affordable housing. This tax credit would increase the profit mar-
gins for private companies to build affordable housing. In some cases, 
the cost of building affordable homes is greater than the market value 
of these homes. It would require a tax credit to close this “appraisal gap” 
and create a margin of profit. This would in turn increase the supply of 
affordable housing for low- to moderate-income Americans.
Government Mandated Affordable Housing - In many communities 
throughout the country, local government mandates that a specified 
percentage of all new construction be designated as affordable housing. 
The federal government should consider a mandate that federal housing 
aid to states be tied to a requirement that all new construction and/or 
renovations in the state provide a set percentage of affordable and low-
income housing. The federal government today provides billions of 
dollars in incentives for homeownership, particularly by means of the 
tax-deductible homeowner interest deduction, which serves as an indi-
rect subsidy to housing developers. A federal mandate to have a percent-
age of affordable housing in every construction project would ensure 
that housing developers across the country pay back, in part, some of 
the consideration given to them by the public treasury.
3. Simplify Homeownership and Cut its Cost
Currently, much of the regulation for buying a home is at the state level, 
consisting of various compliance costs and practices. Housing policy varies 
considerably from state to state. A national standard could greatly simplify the 
home-buying process, and because of this the costs of compliance would lessen. 
For years, consumer groups have advocated strengthening the Homeownership 
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), but this effort has been successfully opposed 
by the mortgage lending industry, which was concerned that a strengthening of 
HOEPA would limit the securitization of subprime loans.
As the nation now faces the possibility of a recession—primarily fueled by the 
subprime loan crisis and the mass securitization of bad subprime loans—we all 
•
•
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can see how greater regulation of the mortgage lending industry would have 
been beneficial to the nation as a whole. In response to the subprime mortgage 
crisis, the Federal Reserve has finally taken a few of the many steps advocated by 
consumer groups years ago. It recently approved a proposal to require mort-
gage companies to outline more clearly how the customer will be able to make 
the required payments, and to show more clearly the additional costs of a loan 
that are often hidden in interest payments. This Federal Reserve plan is limited 
to subprime loans, but could and should be expanded to all home loans. All 
Americans deserve a more transparent home loan process. HOEPA should also 
be expanded to include contractors, appraisers, and other actors in real estate 
transactions.
Federal legislators ought to follow the advice of the 2000 “Curbing Predatory 
Home Mortgage Lending” report, and simplify the Real Estate Settlement Pro-
cedures Act (RESPA) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to make the home 
loan process more comprehensible for the consumer. It should also demand 
greater accuracy in initial good faith estimates made by mortgage lenders. This 
would give the consumer a clearer idea of the costs of home buying.
Federal Government Subsidy for closings costs and down payments - For 
too many would-be homebuyers, the closing costs and down payment 
necessary to get a mortgage are large up-front costs that make buying 
a home prohibitively expensive. In order to reach the people-of-color 
populations that were excluded from full participation in the homeown-
ership aspects of previous programs like the GI Bill, such as low interest 
loans with zero down payment, a new federal program must be offered 
to first-time home buyers. 
 
A federal subsidy covering 50% of closing costs and the down payment 
should be offered on a once-in-a-lifetime basis for a first-time home 
buyer purchasing a moderately-priced home in an affordable commu-
nity. Though not nearly as generous as the home buying benefits that 
made White Americans majority homeowners, this type of govern-
ment policy would be a step forward in giving would-be homeowners a 
greater opportunity to acquire the number-one wealth-building asset for 
most Americans.
Wealth Development and Wealth Education
Our nation needs to make a dramatic re-investment in broadening wealth and 
opportunity. Wealth and savings are stabilizing forces for families and serve as 
the basis on which intergenerational transfers are made. The transfers of wealth 
from one generation to another open up access to higher education, home-own-
ership, savings, and investments. As a growing amount of sociological research 
reveals, the net worth of one generation contributes significantly to the wealth 
prospects of the next generation.50
•
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Cutting across racial lines, families with equal wealth have similar educational 
results, economic practices, and health conditions. Asset assistance will be all 
the more meaningful to people of color who disproportionately hold few or no 
assets. Wealth development aimed at marginalized people of color would help 
fulfill the next phase of the US Civil Rights movement. Moreover, the imple-
mentation of asset-building policies that are racially and ethnically inclusive will 
strengthen the social fabric for everyone in future generations.
The US personal savings rate was about 11% in 1974. In 2004 the savings rate 
was 0%. Credit card debt tripled in the last twenty years to over $80 billion, and 
bankruptcy in 2005 hit a record level of 2 million people. Working together, we 
must make savings and wealth development a national mission, and ensure that 
those historically marginalized are at the forefront of this mission.
1. Individual Development Accounts
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are savings accounts that provide 
matching funds to assist and provide greater incentives for lower-income 
families to save and build wealth. Just as upper-income Americans often receive 
matching funds from their employer for 401K retirement accounts, lower- and 
middle-income Americans would be eligible to receive matching funds for their 
IDA through partnerships among various community-based organizations, 
government programs, and the private sector. Currently there are many small 
IDA programs across the country, which have provided insight into the greater 
possibilities of a mass wealth development program. The 2002 Millennial Hous-
ing Commission reported that “[IDA] demonstration program results show very 
low-income families actually save at a higher rate than the less-poor, with an 
average savings of $900 annually... Recent proposals have been levied suggesting 
a 100 percent tax credit to financial institutions to provide 1:1 matches of up to 
$500 annually per qualified individual saving in an IDA.”
To address the chasmic racial wealth divide between White America and disen-
franchised racial minorities in the United States, a comprehensive IDA program 
would be required. At 18 and older, a nontaxable interest-earning IDA account 
for low- to moderate-income Americans would be available to save for home-
ownership and/or starting a business. There would be a limit to how much could 
be deposited in any given year. Money could be accessed tax-free if used for the 
closing costs and/or down payment on a home, or for costs related to starting a 
business.
2. Kid Savings Accounts 
A version of this type of program was recently started in England. In 2003, the 
British Parliament established small government-financed trust funds for each 
newborn in the country. In 1998 US Senator Robert Kerrey introduced similar 
legislation in the US Congress to create what he called “KidSave” accounts.
Thomas Shapiro and Melvin Oliver in Black Wealth/White Wealth suggest that a 
KidSave program be developed so that low- to moderate-income youth, upon 
becoming adults, have some starting capital with which they can enter their 
Asset assistance 
will be all the more 
meaningful to 
people of color who 
disproportionately 
hold few or no 
assets.
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adult life. These funds could be utilized only for higher education, job training, 
or homeownership.
3. Strengthen Programs Providing Low Cost Credit
Providing high-cost loans to low- to moderate-income individuals with less than 
perfect credit can too often, as shown by our current subprime economic crisis, 
lead to unsustainable mortgage agreements. Low interest mortgage loans are 
required for more of wealth-poor America. Vehicles such as low interest, tax- 
free mortgage revenue bonds, currently sold to investors, need to be made more 
widely available so that first-time homebuyers who are low- to moderate-income 
have greater access to low-interest loans.
4. A Wealth Program tied to Financial Education
With wealth development must come wealth education and financial literacy. 
The 2002 Millennial Housing Commission reports that face-to-face counseling 
reduces defaults on home mortgages by up to 34 percent. This report also points 
out that financial education programs for low-income people are drastically in-
adequate. Only 120,000 to 150,000 individuals received pre-purchase education 
through HUD-related programs out of approximately one million lower-income 
first-time homebuyers.
Creating mass wealth-building programs will provide a big network that 
can respond to requirements for participation in wealth education before 
participants receive program benefits. These wealth education programs will 
strengthen individuals’ economic conditions as well as the national economy. 
Wealth education will assist individuals in using the private market to their 
benefit. For example, studies have shown that up to 30% of those with high-cost 
subprime loans could have qualified for lower-cost mortgages,51 but were not 
aware of this fact.
Tax Wealth to Build Wealth
Wealth-building efforts need a revenue stream in order to have a real impact. 
Historically, progressive taxation has been the source of this revenue stream. 
Post-World War II investment in the development of the great White American 
middle class was paid for by a system of progressive taxation. The top income-
tax rate coming out of the war was 91% (it’s 35% today); the estate tax included 
a provision that taxed fortunes over $50 million at a 70% rate. Because many of 
the benefits of post-war spending were widely shared, the progressivism of the 
tax system enjoyed widespread political support.
Wealth taxation and wealth development need one another. Taxing concentrated 
wealth and linking the revenues to programs that will spread wealth into the 
next generation is the political heart of a winning strategy to expand wealth and 
equality of opportunity. The cumulative impact of a program to broaden wealth 
by taxing wealth would be to dramatically reduce, over a generation, the dispari-
ties of wealth in the United States.
Taxing concentrated 
wealth and linking the 
revenues to programs 
that will spread wealth 
into the next generation 
is the political heart 
of a winning strategy 
to expand wealth and 
equality of opportunity.
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In the last 35 years, the richest one percent of America witnessed a 62 percent 
drop in their federal tax rate while their incomes have increased over 80 percent. 
This rapid increase in income has led to an overabundance of in-hand cash re-
quiring investment or consumption. This kind of available capital is an example 
of financial liquidity. The wealthy’s financial liquidity, with its concomitant need 
to invest, is at the root of the stock market bubbles we have witnessed.
President Bush has assisted the wealthy of America develop liquidity by giving 
them record-breaking tax cuts. In December 2007 the Federal Reserve invested 
$120 billion in the banking system to assist banks with issues of liquidity that 
were having negative effects on the stock market. So the question must be asked: 
Where is the presidential aid package to assist the American middle- and work-
ing-classes with liquidity, as they struggle to make ends meet?
Increases in the cost of housing, education, and health care paired with massive 
decreases in government investment in affordable housing, employment, and 
job training and an increase in payroll taxes of 25%, have left most of America 
cash-poor. Americans are finding the liquidity needed to pay daily bills through 
debt: credit cards, refinancing, and subprime loans. The American middle and 
working classes are maintaining their lifestyle on a foundation of quicksand—
debt they cannot afford. When will middle-class and working-class America get 
a slice of the bailouts and preferential treatment that those who are least in need 
receive?
1. Maintain the Estate Tax
In 2001, a coalition of business lobbyists and wealthy families achieved a tem-
porary victory in their drive to abolish the nation’s only tax on inherited wealth. 
Congress voted to phase out the estate tax by gradually raising the exemption 
level from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million in 2009. In 2010, the tax will 
disappear so all millionaires and billionaires who die that year will pass on their 
fortunes tax-free. The tax will return to its 2002 levels in 2011 unless Congress 
revisits the issues.
However, the abolition of the estate tax, which only affects less than the wealthi-
est 0.27% of Americans, would cost the nation $1 trillion over 20 years. This 
is revenue the federal government can ill-afford to lose. Freezing the estate tax 
at its 2009 level (taxing inherited fortunes in excess of $3.5 million at a rate of 
45%) would generate initially $20 to $25 billion a year. In the coming decades, 
an enormous intergenerational transfer of wealth will occur because the wealthy 
baby boom generation will be passing on its financial legacy. Estate tax revenue 
will grow to somewhere between $157 billion and $750 billion a year, depend-
ing on the estimated annual growth rate. Using this wealth from the most elite 
members of society to strengthen and grow the middle class could provide a 
primary resource for bridging the growing wealth divide.
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2. Increase Corporate Taxes
From the 1940s to the 1990s, the percentage of federal taxes collected from 
corporations shrank from 33% of the total revenue to 15%. This has occurred 
at the same time that tax contributions from individuals increased from 44% in 
the 1940s to 73% of tax revenue collected in the 1990s. Real people are paying 
more of the cost of government, yet are receiving fewer and fewer benefits.
As corporations continue to make record profits, and middle-class and work-
ing-class Americans increasingly struggle to maintain even the living standards 
that their parents enjoyed, our government must respond. Re-shifting much of 
the responsibility to pay fair taxes back onto the mighty shoulders of corporate 
America, so American citizens can more broadly benefit from the US economy, 
would be a good start.
Do you have a suggestion about the rate to which 
corporate taxes should increase?  Please visit  
http://www.faireconomy.org/dream and tell us 
what you think this rate should be.
3. Increase the Maximum Tax Rate to 45%
Today, someone who earns $200,000 a year pays the same top marginal income 
tax rate of 35 percent as someone who earns $20 million a year. During one of 
the great growth periods in the US, the Kennedy era, the maximum tax rate was 
70 percent on the wealthiest of Americans. Warren Buffett, one of the wealthiest 
men in the United States, recently pointed out that he thought it was shame-
ful that he should pay the same tax rate as his secretary. A modest increase to a 
marginal tax rate of 40% for those with income over $5 million a year and 45% 
for those with income over $10 million a year, would at least symbolically reflect 
the popular maxim “to whom much is given, much is expected.”
4. Close the Tax Gap
In our current tax system only the first $90,000 of an individual’s income is 
counted when the IRS calculates contributions to Social Security. Since Presi-
dent Bush tried to dismantle this very successful anti-poverty program, conser-
vatives have been using their leverage and their powerful voices to insist that 
Social Security is going bankrupt and that reforms are needed. A small reform 
that should take place immediately is that the entire income of the richest 
Americans should be counted when calculating contributions to Social Security, 
as is the case with the rest of our taxpayers.
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Another means to ensure that the wealthiest of America contribute their fair 
share is by yoking the capital gains tax rate with the top income tax rate. Only 
the wealthiest of Americans realize significant income from capital gains, and 
these Americans currently pay a 15% rate on this income. A police officer, on 
the other hand, can end up paying a 35% tax rate on her/his income. The capi-
tal gains tax rate should reflect the progressive nature of the income tax and rise 
for those taking in the highest amount of capital gains.
Affirmative Action
Though affirmative action policies have been successfully attacked and eroded 
over the last thirty years, America must take action in this arena if we decide to-
gether to end the culture of White privilege that has stained this nation through-
out its history. Re-embracing affirmative action policies aimed at disenfranchised 
people of color will be a necessary part of this action. Throughout the world, 
from Finland to Brazil to India to South Africa and in countless other countries, 
affirmative action policies for racial, ethnic, language, economic, gender, and 
other types of groups have been effectively used—and are still used—to fight 
institutional and historic discrimination.
A national White backlash turned against the gains of the Civil Rights move-
ments in the last part of the previous century. It became clear that “a major-
ity of Whites were not willing to authorize a comprehensive racially-oriented 
attack upon poverty and disadvantage.”52 Inadequate affirmative action policies 
advanced by Richard Nixon as a conservative answer to develop greater racial 
equality in the United States became enshrined in the American mind and 
American popular culture as an adequate solution to the problem. Mass govern-
ment investment in the poor and disenfranchised advocated by the Civil Rights 
movement became a more and more remote policy alternative.
When government focus shifted away from investing in the poor and disenfran-
chised, affirmative action became a policy that would disproportionately ben-
efit middle-class racial minorities. This in turn would increase class division in 
minority communities.
Yet for all its limitations, affirmative action would still provide one of the most 
successful and continuous diversity measures in American history. A rededica-
tion of the nation to affirmative action, coupled with the wealth building poli-
cies we discuss in this report, will help redirect the United States onto a path of 
greater racial equality, which in large part has been abandoned since the assas-
sination of Dr. King.
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Conclusion
Almost 40 years ago, a few months before the assassination of Dr. King, our na-
tion was suffering under civil rights injustices, violations and annihilations that 
had remained essentially unaddressed—certainly, unaddressed by any compre-
hensive governmental action—since the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862. 
Dr. King and the millions of people he inspired helped turn the national atten-
tion toward this national shame. During this era, civil rights took a few steps 
forward, at the cost of the blood and tears of many brave Americans. 
But that advancement was not enough.
Over the last several decades, conservative economic theory has given us a series 
of economic policies that have worsened economic inequality in the US. The 
growing concentration of wealth among the already-rich strengthens the eco-
nomic divide between disenfranchised people and the strong, largely White 
high-net-worth class in this nation. Millions of Americans still live in communi-
ties that are separate and unequal.
The government of the United States must look back to the words of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt: “No country, however rich, can afford the waste of its human 
resources... Morally, it is the greatest menace to our social order.” We as a society 
must address the economic alienation of specific groups and members of society, 
such as African-Americans, indigenous peoples, and Latinos. We must follow 
our venerable shared credo that “United We Stand.” 
The subprime crisis threatens US society by deepening the already existing 
wealth divide. The foreclosure of the dream of justice and equal opportunity 
for all must be prevented. United, we can create and implement the holistic, 
progressive, broad-spectrum policies that will protect our dream.
How can we save the dream together?  Share 
with us best practices and sound action steps at  
http://www.faireconomy.org/dream.
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